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XV

WORLD WAR II

How shall we sing the Lord's song in a strange land?

ONE result of the accumulation of all these pressures was to impel such of the intellectuals of Turkistan as could escape and evade the frontier guards to seek sanctuary beyond the reach of the long arm of the Kremlin. After 1923 escape became difficult, and refugees were reduced to a mere trickle. But most of the refugees of the older emigration were men like Mustafa Chokai,[1] Osman Khoja or Togan, who had played a leading part during the interregnum and succeeded in crossing the frontiers before the Soviets had had time effectively to bar the gate. Many of them reached Afghanistan by crossing the Oxus in its higher reaches. Some went to pre-partition India, and settled down in a colony in Peshawar. Osman Khoja is still in Pakistan. Others drifted through the Arab world, and one group established itself in Cairo. Togan found his way ultimately to Turkey, the bourne of many thousands of Crimean and other refugees from Turkic lands farther to the west, some of them, such as Jafar Krimer of the Crimea, men of considerable renown. Mustafa Chokai went to Paris, where he lived as an exile from 1921 onwards and became well known in all circles interested in Central Asian affairs. One, Kayum Khan, a younger man of a well-known Uzbek family, has made a home in Germany. On him fell Chokai's mantle. Later events have shown him to be endowed with gifts of leadership, and not without that singleness of purpose which enabled Jinnah to found a State in Asia not many years ago.

[1] Sometimes known as Chokaiev or Tchokaieff in Russian or French fashion, or as Chokayoghlu in Turkish fashion. The various transliterations of Turkish names, taken through Russian and French, are tiresome.

[see pp. 230-242—Analyst]

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they refer to the attitude of the Russian Whites in the 1918–20 period. But, given agreement that, by whatever means, all are working towards eventual independence and not for an imaginary United States of Russia, there is something to be said at this stage for treating this controversy as more concerned with tactics than with the substance of policy.

Whatever the emphasis, these ideas may seem to be the vague dreams of an embittered emigration, to be dismissed as without substance, impossible of conversion into reality in a practical world. Even in their dreams, it will be said, these men, already old and out of touch with the actual in their own country, contend violently one with another and fail even to subordinate their personal ambition to the common good. This might have been the verdict before 1941.[1] But with the War hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of Central Asian, Caucasian and other 'minority' deserters and prisoners from the Soviet armies, who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. At one time there were well over one million of these people in German prison camps. Many died, but many lived on to serve as legionaries against Russia. They came from all the five republics of Central Asia, from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia and the North Caucasus, from the Volga and the Urals and from the Crimea. During nearly four years of service, they gave proof of their own capacity as soldiers and of the real attitude of the younger generation to the Russia from which they had come. It was a young emigration in mass formation. It was their tragedy that, like the Kalmucks in the XVIIIth century, they were used as pawns in the struggle of two contending empires on the chess-board of power-politics. In such a contest their own aims, however noble, could not be realized.

From Turkistan alone later interrogations established that well over half a million men either deserted to the Germans or were taken prisoner in the first year following June 1941. These were first placed in prison camps in Poland under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazi

[1] For background, see cat. #6, pp. 243-246 --Analyst]

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régime treated all prisoners from Russia. Starvation diet was the rule, and there was no medical care. A raging typhus epidemic attacked the camps, and more than half the prisoners died of hunger, fever and general hardship. Towards the end of 1941 Mustafa Chokai and Kayum Khan, both of whom had been at first arrested by the Germans as former Soviet citizens, were released from Paris and Berlin respectively and met in Paris. They obtained the consent of the German Government to tour the prisoner-of-war camps, where they found their compatriots in the frightful conditions described and persuaded the German Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories under Rosenberg (the Ostministerium) to organize a Commission for the classification and possible enlistment of the prisoners as volunteer legionaries in the German forces. During their tour of the camps, Chokai contracted typhus and was removed to Berlin, where he died in December 1941. The task then fell to Kayum Khan, on whom Chokai's mantle fell as Commissioner for Turkistan. Other Commissioners were appointed by the Ostministerium to deal with men from Azerbaijan, the Volga–Ural, the Caucasus and the Crimea.

Kayum's organization was on a large scale, and succeeded by the end of the war in putting as many as 180,000 men from various parts of Turkistan into one or other formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS. It is true that the larger part of these — rather over 100,000 — were placed in labour, guard, ordnance and supply formations, but there were also at least 40,000 combatant troops, who gave on the whole a good account of themselves. The larger part of the 162nd German Infantry Division was made up of men from Turkistan, and in addition there were nineteen independent battalions and twenty-four infantry companies of which the rank and file consisted wholly of Turks and Tajiks from the east of the Caspian. These were all volunteers in the Wehrmacht. There was also a Waffen-SS formation known as the *Osttürkisches Waffenverband* (East Turkish Armed Formation) made up of four regiments of two battalions each. Of these four regiments, one was composed of men from Turkistan; the

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other three being from Azerbaijan, Volga–Ural and the Crimea respectively. Like so many SS units, this force (not formed until 1944) was not a combatant unit, but was designed as a collective political entity largely for purposes of propaganda. To the very end of the war the German High Command halted between two political opinions as to their treatment of the 'minority' peoples from Russia who had fallen into their hands. As regards those of Turkish race, should they organize on pan-Turkic lines, or should they make a distinction by areas? In either case, should they declare themselves behind liberation movements and in favour of the establishment of independent States, or should they aim, on conquest, at taking these people over as a new German colonial empire? Himmler inclined towards pan-Turkism and at least a declaration of German support for independence; Rosenberg was for a realistic distinction of races, and supported the recognition of independence by several areas; Hitler, with his arrogant contempt for Asiatic peoples, cared for nothing but willing service without conditions and looked to a time when the German yoke would merely replace the Soviet. The Waffen-SS formation, with its grouping of all Russian Turks in one division but with separate regiments, was a compromise between these opinions. In the end Rosenberg was authorized to declare for the recognition of the independence of Turkistan, but not until March 1945, when it was much too late to influence the behaviour of the mercenaries or to affect the issue in any way.

In the beginning things went well. Those in the prison camps had it put to them, 'Either stay where you are, or come and fight against Communism'; and all but some 20,000 of them gladly obeyed the call and volunteered for service. There was a natural desire for freedom from captivity, and it was not until the volunteers realized that the Germans had made no precise declaration of their war aims that doubts began to arise. With the encouragement of the Ostministerium, a national committee (the National Turkistan Unity Committee) was formed under Kayum and charged with the political and

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national leadership of the volunteers. It was expected to act as the honest broker between the men and the German Army and Party authorities. From the beginning this committee worked for German recognition of the principle of national independence for Turkistan, and on this ground was continually at variance with the German authorities and even with the German commanders of the legions. But, as the War went on, Kayum seems to have been tacitly allowed to spread the gospel of independence among the volunteers themselves both in speech and writing. It was found that without such propaganda the morale of the troops could not be sustained, and the Ostministerium, itself sympathetic, gave the committee a free hand, provided that the propaganda was limited to the volunteers themselves. This did not prevent the SS at one stage from demanding that the whole organization of Eastern Turks should submit to work under Vlassov's leadership 'for the liberation of all the peoples of Russia from the Soviet yoke'. This the committee categorically refused. But to the end, that is up to March 1945, there remained a conflict of idea: the Germans enlisted these men for the struggle against Communism, the volunteers were only willing to fight for the restoration of their independence.

This uncertainty of political aim seriously affected the volunteers' morale. The most distinguished officer of commissioned rank among them, Ghulam Alim, a former sergeant in the Red Army who had deserted, felt himself so frustrated that he fled with 200 men into the Slovakian mountains, where he was shot by partisans. This man had won every possible German decoration for bravery, including the Iron Cross, and had been promoted to command of a regiment, but he was distracted by the conflicting political influences and could not stand the course. A further reason for discontent was a narrow and mistrustful German policy in the matter of appointment and promotion of Eastern Turk officers. Almost all the officer cadres were German, more than one unit having a German element up to 15 per cent of its strength. Among 180,000 volunteers there were only eighty-seven Turkish

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668 727 167 officers, out of whom thirteen held only nominal commissioned rank in the National Committee. The remaining seventy-four were distributed fifty-one to the Wehrmacht and twenty-three to the SS formations. The Germans had not even the sense to draw a distinction between deserters and prisoners-of-war, and German commanders angrily attributed discontent on this score to the factious interference of the committee. The men for their part could not but regard the presence of so many Germans, even down to NCO rank, as a sign of obvious mistrust. Language difficulties were great and prevented understanding; the words of command were given in German, and Germans with the units made little or no attempt to learn the Asian languages. An extreme folly was the allotment of a differential scale of rations to Germans and Turks, even to those employed on similar duties within the same unit. The armament handed out consisted mainly of captured Russian weapons notoriously inferior to the German — a policy which had a severe effect on morale since the superiority of German weapons in 1941 was known to have undermined the confidence of the Red Army. It was not surprising that some 3000 desertions took place, but of these only 800 were on the Eastern Front and most of those not to the Red Army but to anti-Soviet partisans.

The Germans did undertake one interesting experiment. In response to requests for religious instruction arrangements were made to attach an *imam* to every unit. Some of these were found from among the personnel in the units themselves, while others were trained in two schools which the German government opened in Dresden and in Göttingen. The Dresden school was intended mainly to train priests for the Waffen-SS formation and, as might be expected from its aims and from the association with it of that old fox El Hajj Amin Hussaini, ex-Mufti of Jerusalem (then in Germany), it tended to subordinate spiritual to political aims and to preach a refined form of pan-Turkic pan-Islamism. The Göttingen theological school was a more genuine attempt to provide for spiritual needs, and one less corrupted by purely political ends

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and catchwords. Some idea of the difference of approach between the two schools, and incidentally of the crudity of German ideas on subjects such as these, can be gathered from the reports. There was hot argument on the point whether it is necessary to draw distinctions between a training in Sunniism and one in Shiism. The Dresden school, influenced apparently by its orthodox Sunni advisers, seems to have flatly announced that Shiism does not really exist, while that at Göttingen was constrained to observe that the people of Turkistan are no doubt all Sunnis, but the majority of the Azeris, like the Persians, are Shiahs, and history demonstrates the lack of understanding between the two.

Religious services and teaching were in great demand in the units and the imams did much to strengthen morale. Experience showed that their ministrations were desired by all of every age-group, including the youngest men. The scheme had of course in it a strong element of exploitation of spiritual needs to serve a worldly end; its welcome suggests a condition of spiritual hunger among the volunteers such as only Soviet propaganda can induce.

In spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of the frequent crudity of method and the general inability of the German officer to give that emotional touch to his relations with men of another race which can alone command the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that on the whole these Eastern Turkish and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not so unfaithfully to the end. Three battalions from Turkistan fought to the last man in front of Stalingrad, others were destroyed in fierce fighting in the Caucasus, six battalions held up the Russian advance for a time in front of Berlin. Altogether they suffered losses in killed of some 50,000 men, and 12,000 war disablements — figures against which the numbers of desertions sink into insignificance. They proved good soldiers with a child-like trust in their officers if these tried to understand them and treat them well. Where there is record of close personal relations being established between officers and men, these Turks were capable

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of extreme devotion, as when a battalion which had broken out of a pocket near Kharkov re-entered it in order to rescue the body of a German commander who had won the affection and respect of his men. Most of them showed astonishing powers of endurance and a flair for guerrilla fighting. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkistan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained a living one within the family, had made the youth sceptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could better understand. There was evidence too that in the Red Army the Muslim peoples had had a raw deal; they disliked the Russian mentality and felt aggrieved. Those who were better educated had in mind the purges and the waves of arrests and banishments which followed any demonstration of national pride; the rank and file recalled bitterly the deprivation of lands and flocks which had gone with collectivization. Those Russian cruelties they would never forget; the bloody eyes[1] of Skobelev, Kuropatkin and the Commissars were for them the eye of a single ogre, who would not leave them in peace. It was fortunate for the Allied cause that the Germans proved so heavy-handed. The inevitable impression is that the Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them only to serve a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to their old masters, and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces, lacking a home and refused understanding, often tortured when not killed, for them the end was bitterness.

Some have remained in the West after all was over. These include Kayum Khan, the leading spirit and the firmest of the national committee, and some of his helpers, as well as a number

[1] An allusion to Skobelev's cognomen, *gök kanli* — bloody-eyes.

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of members of the national committees who dealt with volunteers from other minorities within Soviet Russia, in particular those from the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan. These continue to be the most prominent representatives of the new Muslim emigration from the USSR. They are in a strong position as against the older emigration, in that they have now an intimate sense of the hopes and fears, the elations and disappointments, of a great mass of their countrymen who had risked and often given their lives for what they thought their aim and duty — the liberation of their country from the Russian yoke. In their persons they have renewed the experience which inspired men like Togan and Chokai in the old days of the interregnum period of 1918 to 1924. Once more they have failed to realize their dreams; Hitler's Germany, though they had no chance to look elsewhere, was not the helper that they needed. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth brought up in Communist schools.

It is not surprising that Soviet Russia after the war should bend so much energy to the suppression of all signs of nationalism among the kinsmen of these men in Turkistan.

There is one aspect of these events of some further significance. We know how the Soviets had divided the Eastern Turkish peoples into separate units on an ostensibly racial and linguistic basis — the policy of cantonization. The name of Turkistan disappeared from the Russian map in 1924. Later measures in the linguistic field, and the introduction of separate Roman and later Cyrillic scripts for each republic, intensified local idiosyncrasies and hampered mutual understandings. The ban on religion in education weakened such unifying effect as might have accrued from common religious thought. We have seen, too, how the Germans tended to the other extreme, and, while halting between two opinions, were inclined to flirt with ideas of pan-Turkism. The national

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MUSLIMS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS

Richard Pipes

Part II

ETHNIC IDENTITY OF CENTRAL ASIAN MUSLIMS

UNTIL THE BEGINNING of the 20th century, Central Asia preserved its ethnic homogeneity remarkably well. The tsarist government discouraged the migration of Slavs into the steppe region for fear of native rebellions, while Turkestan, which in the centuries prior to Russian conquest had been one of the world's most isolated areas, virtually closed to non-Muslims, absorbed only a small trickle of Russian officials and merchants. Khiva and Bukhara continued even after the establishment of the Russian protectorate to admit only a small number of Russians. At the turn of the century Muslims formed over 90 percent of the total population of all Central Asia; in Turkestan itself they accounted for 97 percent of all the inhabitants.[6] (See Table I.)

Perhaps the most significant single change which has occurred in Central Asia during the last half century has been the destruction of its ethnic homogeneity, brought about by Russian and Ukrainian immigration.

The first great migratory wave of Russians entered between 1906 and 1911, during the ministry of P. Stolypin, as a result of the deliberate effort of the tsarist regime to reduce the land hunger of the Russian villages by

[6] These statistics, and those which follow are based mainly on three sources: *Aziatskaia Rossiia*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914); *Ts. St. Upr. SSSR. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk naseleniia SSSR* (Moscow, 1928); and *Strany mira* (Moscow, 1946).

Table I: RUSSIAN AND NATIVE POPULATION OF CENTRAL ASIA

(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Muslims	9,300,000	10,400,000	10,700,000	c. 11,700,000
Russians	700,000	2,000,000	2,700,000	c. 4,500,000
Others	300,000	600,000	300,000	c. 400,000
Total	10,300,000	13,000,000	13,700,000	16,600,000

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settling some of their excess population in the sparsely inhabited steppe regions of Central Asia. This colonizing enterprise brought to Central Asia about 1 million peasants, most of whom made their home in the eastern parts of the steppe region and in the Semirechensk province of Turkestan. The newcomers were provided by the government with generous land allotments (transferred from the Crown, which claimed as its property all the nomadic grazing lands) and inventory, and settled in compact villages, apart from the Kazakh-Kirghiz natives, most of whom continued their traditional nomadic or seminomadic habits. The colonization program had only a limited success, for after the outbreak of World War I the large-scale Russian influx into the steppe regions ceased; the Russians living in the Kazakh Republic in 1939 still consisted in their majority of the original Stolypin colonists or their direct descendants. The proportion of Russians in the total population of the steppe region would not have grown appreciably, therefore, were it not for the fact that the upheavals which had occurred in that area during World War I and the Russian Revolution (the 1916 Kazakh-Kirghiz revolt, and the famine of 1920–21) led to a considerable decrease in the native population. While the Kazakh-Kirghiz population remained virtually constant between 1911 and 1926, the local Russian population increased during the same period through natural growth by one-fourth. As a result of these demographic changes, Muslims constituted by 1926 only two-thirds of the population of the Kazakh Republic. (See Table II.)

Turkestan succeeded in maintaining its ethnic homogeneity somewhat longer than the steppe region. The Russian influx into Turkestan prior to the Revolution was predominantly urban, consisting of officials, merchants, military personnel, and other groups connected with this area's administration and economic development. Thus, in 1926 the Russians still constituted merely 7.4 percent of the population of Turkestan.

The next important change in the demography of Central Asia occurred around 1930 as a consequence of Russian immigration and the further decrease of the native population. The Russians who migrated into Central Asia during this period were both victims of collectivization seeking to find refuge and to make a living on the Asiatic frontier, and settlers who followed in the wake of the newly constructed Turkestan-Siberian (Turksib) railroad. These migrants — whose number may be tentatively esti-

Table II: DISTRIBUTION OF THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN CENTRAL ASIA
(Including estimates for Khiva and Bukhara; in round figures)

	1897	*1911*	*1926*	*1939*
Steppe	500,000	1,600,000	2,100,000	c. 2,600,000
Turkestan	200,000	400,000	600,000	c. 1,900,000
Percent of Russians in total population of Central Asia	6.8	15.3	19.7	c. 27.1

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mated between 1926 and 1939 at 1,300,000 — settled not in the steppe but in Turkestan. While the 1939 census did not provide ethnographic breakdowns for the individual republics (with one exception noted below [9]), it is possible, by comparing the growth of the population within the individual republics with the total growth of the major Central Asian ethnic groups (both reported by Soviet sources), to arrive at a reasonably close estimate of the distribution of the Russian newcomers:

In the Uzbek Republic	720,000
In the Kirghiz Republic	285,000
In the Tajik Republic	155,000
In the Turkmen Republic	135,000

More than one-half of the migrants, in other words, settled in the Uzbek Republic, where in all probability most of them moved into the towns (Tashkent especially) and the expanding industrial centers of the Ferghana valley. In the Tajik and Turkmen Republics most of the Russian newcomers probably also settled in the cities, while in Kirghizia, where there were numerous Russian agricultural settlements of pre-Revolutionary vintage, they moved into the countryside as well (the total urban population of the Kirghiz Republic grew, between 1926 and 1939, only by 150,000, whereas the total Russian population there increased in the same period by an estimated 285,000 immigrants).

Another factor which increased the ratio of Russians to Muslims in Central Asia was the decline in the Muslim population of the steppe due to the terrors of the period of collectivization. According to Soviet census statistics, the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union decreased between 1926 and 1939 from 3,960,000 to 3,099,000 — a decline of about a million and a half if one takes into consideration the normal rate of growth.

Thus, by 1939 the Muslims probably formed less than one-half of the inhabitants in the steppe region and about four-fifths of those in Turkestan. The ratio of Muslims to Russians in all of Central Asia dropped from 15 to 1 in 1897 to less than 4 to 1 in 1939. Obviously, such a rapid demographic change was bound to have profound effects on the ability of the natives to preserve their ethnic identity, the more so since the influx of Russians appears to have continued undiminished after 1939, becoming particularly rapid during the period of war-time evacuation (1942–44) and the new program of Russian and Ukrainian settlement in the Kazakh steppes since 1952.

On the face of it, Russian migration threatens the natives with eventual destruction. Central Asia appears to be faced with ethnic Russification,

[9] The Turkmen SSR is the exception. Official Soviet statistics for 1939, when the total population of this republic was 1,251,900, break down its ethnic structure as follows: Turkmen 59.2 percent; Russians 18.7 percent; Uzbeks 8.5 percent; Kazakhs 4.9 percent; other nationalities 8.7 percent. Z. G. Freikin, *Turkmenskaia SSR* (Moscow, 1954), p. 84.

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which may bring about the complete assimilation of the natives. However, in order to determine the effect of the Russian influx upon the natives it is necessary to go beyond mere statistics and to analyze the nature and scope of relations between these two groups. What matters is not so much how many Russians come to live in Central Asia, but whether, through intermarriage, social contact, cultural and other means, they actually exercise a denationalizing influence upon the Muslims. The answer to this question is not as discouraging for Muslim prospects as might appear from the mere survey of demographic statistics.

The Russians who migrate into Central Asia do not displace the natives, but settle side by side with them. The Russo-Ukrainian influx into Central Asia resembles not so much a demographic inundation, which gradually spreads over and submerges the whole native population, as a stream which penetrates the area following the path of least resistance and covers the regions which are least populated. It thus splits the population into two unequal parts, both of which retain their national character.

As has been pointed out above, the Russians inhabiting the steppe region in 1939 were largely the descendants of the pre-1914 colonists, living in the separate Russo-Ukrainian villages (now collectivized) or in the predominantly Russian-inhabited cities. When the Kazakhs were collectivized in the 1930's, and in many instances forcefully settled as well, they were formed into separate *kolkhozy* (collective farms), apart from the old and established Russo-Ukrainian villages. The establishment of ethnically mixed collectives was impractical, partly because the Russians were already settled in their own communities and partly because the basis of the native economy, sheep and livestock grazing, was different from that of the predominantly agricultural Russian villages.[10] The overwhelming majority of the Russian and Kazakh peasants in Kazakhstan, therefore, continues to live in separate settlements. Interviews with refugees from this region indicate that until the outbreak of World War II, at any rate, there were practically no ethnically mixed *kolkhozy*, although closely situated villages were frequently combined for administrative purposes into a single *sel'sovet* (village soviet), even when consisting of differing ethnic groups. Occasionally stray Russians may be found working on Kazakh collectives: doctors, nurses, bookkeepers, and so forth — as often as not persons who found it expedient for one reason or another to leave their native regions. Kazakh shepherds and laborers are also employed by some Russian collectives. But these are cases affecting individuals which do not change the general picture of ethnic separation in the rural areas.

[10] Attempts to mix collectives apparently had little success: "Instead of organizing the greatest possible mutual assistance of Russian and Kazakh collective farms," writes an official Kazakh Republic publication, "[the authorities] permitted instances of formation of international collective farms, ignoring the fact that the mass of the collective farmers was not as yet prepared for them." *10 let Kazakhstana — 1920–1930* (Alma-Ata, 1930), p. 216.

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The situation is somewhat different in the *sovkhozy* (state farms), which are operated like large enterprises with hired labor (there were 191 *sovkhozy* in the Kazakh Republic in 1938). The *sovkhozy* carry out diversified agricultural functions, and hire many Muslims to tend the sheep and livestock — a task they can carry out better than the Russians workers. They also employ some Muslim white-collar workers.

A similar picture of ethnic separation exists in Turkestan. In pre-Revolutionary times the Russians moving into the cities of Turkestan followed the custom of Europeans in other colonial areas of the world, and rather than make their home in the Oriental quarters, insanitary and overcrowded by Western standards, or build new cities from scratch, they constructed separate European sections adjoining the native towns. In this way, nearly all the cities in Turkestan were split into two halves: native, or Old, and European, or New. Significant exceptions to this rule were only Vernyi (Alma-Ata), whose geographic location did not permit the planning of a separate Russian sector, and Kokand, in the Ferghana valley, which the Russians left entirely to the natives, erecting the European town some 8 miles away, in Skobelev (Fergana). After the advent of the Communists this basic pattern remained, with one important change: leaving the Old and the New sections of the towns intact, the Soviet authorities constructed in most towns new quarters to house the officials, employees, and other privileged elements of Soviet society, who are predominantly, but not exclusively, European. Thus, most Central Asian towns today are divided into three parts: one predominantly native, another predominantly European, and a third one mixed, with Europeans dominant. The new quarters house alike native and Russian employees of the state; the natives living there, however, belong exclusively to the so-called "intelligentsia," which is Westernized and bilingual and constitutes a relatively small segment of the total native urban population. The majority of Russians and of natives continue, as before the Revolution, to live in their respective quarters, though the lines separating these quarters seem less sharp than they were before. A general mixing of the urban population has certainly not occurred.

As a result of this situation, the large influx of Russians into the cities does not have the effect of submerging the native population. Rather it leads to a great expansion of the European and Soviet sectors, a development which has no direct effect upon the native parts of the towns. The settlement of newcomers in the native quarters is quite unlikely, if only because of the overcrowding which prevails in almost all of them, as in most Oriental towns.

The next question which arises is whether, despite the residential separation, the Russians and Muslims actually assimilate through intermarriage and social contact. Here we must rely for answers entirely on interview material.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953)-1955 RLI Turkestan RLI

herding with agriculture. Both these factors caused a rapid decline in nomadism in Central Asia in the latter half of the 19th century, under Russian rule. In 1926 (i.e., on the eve of collectivization) in Kazakhstan — the main area of nomadism — 26 percent of all the Kazakh families were fully settled, 66 percent practiced nomadism in the summers (transhumance), and only the remaining 6 percent to 8 percent were nomadic the year around. Of the major group, i.e., those practicing summer nomadism, more than two-thirds moved within a 25-kilometer radius of their winter quarters.[13] Soviet collectivization thus completed a process of settlement that was already well on its way, and given another few decades might have been accomplished quite naturally. A by-product of settlement is the decline of the tribe as a unit of social organization, and with it the disappearance of the tribal divisions and feuds which in the past have constituted one of the most serious deterrents to the development of a national consciousness among the Central Asian natives. The natives of the steppe and desert chafe greatly under the severe limitations imposed upon their movement by the Soviet regime, and, given freedom, would probably like to return at least in part to some form of nomadism; nevertheless, the tribal structure is probably destroyed beyond repair. This fact greatly strengthens the development of modern nationalism.

Thus, despite the considerable Russian influx into Central Asia, the Muslims living there appear to maintain their ethnic distinctiveness. This is thanks both to the character of Russian settlement, which leads to the establishment of Russian centers *side by side* rather than *among* the natives, and to the wide cultural gap, which hinders intermarriage and more intimate social contact. Indeed, it may be said that Russian migration and Soviet policies have rather contributed to the development of national consciousness, first by exposing all natives to contact with representatives of an alien culture and thus forcing them to question their own status, and secondly by helping to destroy — through settlement — the tribal divisions which had always been a most formidable obstacle to native unity vis-à-vis the foreigner.

THE INTELLIGENTSIA

An important factor in the transformation of an ethnic group into a full-fledged nation with a developed sense of national consciousness is an articulate class with sufficient education and experience to provide the population with intellectual leadership. In societies which have only recently begun to undergo such a transformation, this function is usually assumed by what the Russians call "intelligentsia" — a class composed of individuals of diverse social background whom a common middle or higher education, qualifying it for professional or white-collar work, turns into a new social estate.

[13] *10 let Kazakhstana*, pp. 82–83.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

177 668 without the surrender of the local ethos. It is strongest and most vital in societies which, like the mid-20th-century Muslims of Central Asia, are in the very throes of this process of cultural fusion.

167 177 668 The Russian influx, uninterrupted since the beginning of the present century, does not hinder this development except where it is accompanied by large-scale physical destruction of the natives (as was the case with the Kazakhs). On the contrary, it rather strengthens it. In the Central Asian context, the Russian population with its Russian culture must be regarded primarily as an agent of Westernization, and hence as a force accelerating the transition of the natives to full-fledged nationhood. The Russians not only tend to promote the spread of such ideas as secularism, utility, and anti-traditionalism, but also by their very presence and cultural cohesion, to induce the native to define his own national status. The Russian influx thus has not led to the emergence of a new, third nationality, "Soviet" in its culture, but to the split of the population of Central Asia into two parts: this split has tended to crystallize the national consciousness of both groups.

178 668 648 Without indulging in the dangerous and fruitless game of prediction (which always presupposes some degree of historical pre-determination), it is still possible, on the basis of the evidence adduced above, to arrive at some general political conclusions from the cultural tendencies discernible in Soviet Central Asia.

In the first place, Soviet Central Asia may be expected to grow in importance as an internal problem for the regimes, present and future, ruling Russia and its possessions. The Muslim natives, formed into full-fledged nationalities with settled populations, well-defined cultures, and indigenous intelligentsias, will be far more troublesome to their rulers than the disunited, half-nomadic, Islam-dominated Muslim tribes and ethnic groups of the past have been. In the second place, the entire area of Central Asia, including Chinese Turkestan with which Russian Central Asia has always been closely connected, may well tend to move with time in the direction of independent statehood. It is not inconceivable that this vast territory may same day be encompassed in a new Turkic, Muslim state, oriented toward the Middle East, and serving as a buffer among Russia, China, and India. In the past this has been prevented by Russian conquest and Russia's policy of supporting Chinese authority in Sinkiang out of fear of British and Japanese activity in this sensitive region. With Britain and Japan out of Central Asia, Russo-Chinese cooperation may be less intensive than before, and any possible disagreements among the great powers bordering on this area will only benefit the national aspirations of the local Muslims. Whether or not this will occur cannot, of course, be foreseen. But so long as the Central Asian Muslims continue to preserve their cultural peculiarities and, under Communist pressures, to evolve the characteristics of modern nationalities, as they have done in Soviet territories, so long will the cultural and ethnic bases for such a development be present.

8:Kostenko -85-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RL1 Turkestan
RL1

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It has already been said that the population of the Turkestan region is growing not as a result of natural increase but for the most part, as a consequence of a large influx of native and Russian colonists. The influx of nomad camps from other oblast's and adjacent dominions, although they do increase the population /383/ of the steppe belt of the government general, is not a permanent matter.

The in-migration of sedentary aliens is of a completely different nature. This movement has every earmark of a colonizing movement of permanent character, and it has already shown remarkable success in a comparatively short time in populating the area. This promises a still greater development of a sedentary way of life in the populated oases in the future.

In this movement one can trace two original currents: one, a mass of newcomers moving toward the southern oases of the cultivated belt, consists of migrants from the adjacent independent dominions; the second, coming from interior Russia and Siberia, furnishes the region with a Russian colonizing population.

The peace and order established in the Russian oblast's of Turkestan and the incomparably fewer taxes serve as attractions for the emigration of natives from the neighboring countries. The significance of this migration can be judged by the gradually rising figures of the sedentary houses in the uyezds of the Syr-Darya oblast', where the population has not increased by the addition of new settlements.

/384/ 8:Kostenko -86-G-4,5 (1868-80)1880 RLl Turkestan RLl

By Uyezds	The Number of Sedentary Houses										Increase	
	1868	1869	1870	1871	1872	1873	1874	1875	1876	1877	Absolute	%
Kurama..	27,631	28,784	28,877	30,417	30,507	30,508	31,383	31,283	31,283	31,330	3,699	13
Khodzhent.. including former Dzhazak (Dzhizak)	15,806	15,806	18,393	20,915	24,333	24,335	24,620	24,620	23,339	25,727	9,920	63
Chimkent..	3,467	5,063	5,347	6,735	4,030	4,327	4,467	4,467	4,467	4,633		
Turkestan..					2,750	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,805	2,841	4,007	116
Auliye-Ata..	363	413	564	709	709	709	791	795	795	932	569	157
Total	47,267	50,066	53,181	58,776	62,329	62,682	64,066	63,970	62,689	65,463	18,196	39

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167 /385/ From this table it can be seen that the number of sedentary households in the oblast' increased on the whole by almost 40%. In the Turkestan, Chimkent and Auliye-Ata uyezds, the sedentary population more than doubled, in Khodzhent uyezd it increased 63% and only in the Kurama uyezd was the increase as low as 13% according to the official figures.

The figure of 18,196 new houses corresponds approximately to 100,000 persons of both sexes. This figure does not include, however, the members of the immigrant trade, crafts and the class of unskilled laborers, who are not registered in the volost's and villages, but whose number must be quite considerable after the twelve years of existence of the region. It cannot be expressed in definite figure because of the lack of reliable evidence. The total sum of new colonizing population which has settled in the Syr-Darya oblast' from 1867 to 1877 adds up to approximately 300,000 persons. In the Zeravshan okrug from 1871 to 1876 the number of houses increased from 44,794 to 52,171, which amounts to about a 25% increase for five years.

167 The colonizing movement in Semirechie is just as successful. This part of the region is being colonized almost exclusively by Russian immigrants from western Siberia (primarily from the Tobolsk guberniya) as well as the interior guberniyas of the empire (especially from the Voronezh guberniya). Every year more and more transports of immigrants pour in, so many that the local administration can scarcely provide land for all of them. The distribution of Russian settlers in Semirechie moved along

167 the path of the offensive action of our armies, that is, along the main road from Semipalatinsk, through Kopal, Vernyi (Alma Ata), and further to Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul), along the northern piedmont of the Dzungarian and Trans-Ili Alatau and the Alexander Range. The influx of new settlers impelled the local administration to allot them land further south. Thus in a short time the eastern half of the shore of lake Issyk Kul was studded with Russian villages and hamlets. In addition a large settlement rose up on the upper Tekes (Okhotnichiya sloboda) from which some families split off and settled at the entrance to the Muzart pass.

/386/ It is now being suggested that colonists be sent further south, to the bottom of the Tien-Shan massif, to settle the fertile valleys of Dzhumgal On-archi, Ottuka, Kurtki, Togus-Torau, and Ketmen-Tyube. Still farther south along the valley of At-Basha and Kara-Koyuna there are also places favorable to sedentary life. However, because of the elevation [311] of these valleys (7000 feet) wheat will not always grow successfully, and in addition the cold sets in early (in August). Sedentary life cannot spread further south along the valleys of Ak-Say and Myudurun. Here the fertile pasture places attract the nomads only in the two summer months after which they take their flocks down to lower valleys.

167 One can judge the success of the colo-
563 nizing movement in Semirechie by the fact that at the time the region was founded there were 20 small villages in the oblast' altogether and the Russian population was 30,000. Now there are 65 small villages in the oblast'

167 and 44,089 Russians. Of the total of 44,089,
563 20,641 (1) are classified as Cossacks, living in villages and forming the Semirechie Cossack division.

1. Of these 10,715 are males and 9,926 females. This figure refers to January 1, 1879; in 1867 there were 7,730 males and 6,683 females.

361 The peasant population,[1] lives in villages
563 and settlements. Sometimes it happens that a peasant village will be situated near or rather directly beside a Cossack station.

The character of the formation of Cossack village and peasant villages is completely different, reflecting the characteristics of the inhabitants.

The Semirechie Cossack division is formed of Siberian Cossacks of Great Russian origin. On the other hand the peasant colonizers are Ukrainians. Even the immigrants from the Tobolsk guberniya belong to this nationality, since they had moved to western Siberia from Ukrainian localities previously and have now continued their wanderings further. The external appearance of the Cossack villages in Semirechie somewhat recalls the settled points of our former military settlements. The houses are built alike, one next to the other, primarily of /387/ logs. There are no flower gardens or vegetable gardens around the houses, which gives the station a mournful appearance. The small peasant villages, on the contrary, are distinguished for their attractive exteriors. The village is drowned in a mass of gardens

[1] [In Seminechie - Analyst]